USA v. Raymond Napolitan by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-19-2016 
USA v. Raymond Napolitan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Raymond Napolitan" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 684. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/684 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-1602 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
RAYMOND ANTHONY NAPOLITAN, 
       Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-11-cr-00146-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Mark R. Hornak 
_____________ 
 
Submitted: February 11, 2016 
 
Before: FUENTES, KRAUSE, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  July 19, 2016) 
_____________ 
 
AKIN ADEPOJU, ESQUIRE 
RENEE PIETROPAOLO, ESQUIRE 
2 
 
Office of Federal Public Defender 
1001 Liberty Avenue 
1500 Liberty Center 
Pittsburgh, PA 15222 
 
Counsel for Appellant 
 
DONOVAN J. COCAS, ESQUIRE 
REBECCA R. HAYWOOD, ESQUIRE 
Office of United States Attorney 
700 Grant Street 
Suite 4000 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
 
Counsel for Appellee 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Raymond Anthony Napolitan appeals his federal 
criminal sentence for possession with intent to distribute five 
hundred grams or more of cocaine on the ground that it was 
substantively unreasonable for the District Court to run his 
federal sentence consecutively to a separate state sentence 
that Napolitan now claims is itself unconstitutional under 
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).  Today we 
join our sister Circuits in holding that a defendant may not 
challenge the reasonableness of his federal sentence on appeal 
via a collateral attack on a prior state sentence.  Accordingly, 
we will affirm the sentence imposed by the District Court. 
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I. Background 
 Napolitan was arrested in 2007 after police discovered 
nearly a kilogram of cocaine in his home in Farrell, 
Pennsylvania, along with drug trafficking paraphernalia and a 
series of firearms.  In 2008, based on facts that came to light 
as part of the drug bust, Napolitan was convicted of sexual 
assault and simple assault in a bench trial in the Mercer 
County Court of Common Pleas.  Napolitan was then 
sentenced in state court to five to ten years1 pursuant to a 
then-operational Pennsylvania state law, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 9712, that increased the mandatory minimum sentence for a 
“crime of violence” when the sentencing judge determined by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the perpetrator 
possessed a firearm that was used to frighten the victim 
during the commission of the offense.  The Pennsylvania 
Superior Court has since ruled en banc that this sentencing 
regime is unconstitutional in light of Alleyne, which held that 
whenever the existence of a particular fact serves to increase 
a statutory minimum sentence as a matter of law, that fact 
amounts to an “element” of the underlying crime that must be 
proven to the factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt, Alleyne, 
133 S. Ct. at 2158.  Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 
                                              
 1 The Government avers that Napolitan was instead 
sentenced to 66-132 months in state court.  For purposes of 
this appeal, we accept that Napolitan was sentenced under 
state law “to a term of not less than 5 years nor more than 10 
years on the crime of Sexual Assault,” as reflected in the trial 
court judge’s January 9, 2009 opinion, which was “written 
pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925 
following [Napolitan’s] timely appeal from the denial of his 
[motion for post-sentence relief].”  App. 389, 391. 
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116-117 & n.4 (Pa. Super Ct. 2013) (en banc); see also 
Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 801, 811 (Pa. Super 
Ct. 2014), appeal denied 124 A.3d 209 (Pa. 2015); 
Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86, 101 n.9 (Pa. Super 
Ct. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 121 A.3d 496 (Pa. 2015). 
 In 2011, a grand jury in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania indicted Napolitan on two counts related to the 
2007 drug bust: possession with intent to distribute five 
hundred grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(ii), and possession of a firearm in 
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).  A jury convicted Napolitan of the 
drug possession charge,2 and he was initially sentenced to 78 
months’ imprisonment, to run consecutively to his existing 
state sentence.  After Napolitan appealed his conviction to our 
Court, requesting a new trial on the ground of alleged false 
witness testimony, and the Government cross-appealed, 
claiming the District Court should have applied certain 
sentencing enhancements, we affirmed the conviction but 
remanded for resentencing in consideration of the sentencing 
enhancements at issue.  United States v. Napolitan, 762 F.3d 
297, 301, 307 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 At resentencing, the District Court applied one of the 
sentencing enhancements and entered a 90-month sentence 
for the federal drug conviction.  After considering the 
arguments Napolitan now raises on appeal, the District Court 
                                              
 2 The firearm count was not submitted to the jury 
because the District Court granted Napolitan’s motion for 
judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 29. 
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stated on the record that it was appropriate to run the federal 
sentence consecutively to Napolitan’s state sentence because, 
even though the offenses underlying both sentences arose in 
the same general time frame, the state and federal crimes 
were distinct.3  
Napolitan now appeals, arguing that the District 
Court’s decision to run his two sentences consecutively was 
substantively unreasonable.  He urges—as he did at his 
resentencing—that because his state sentence was calculated 
under a statute that required an increase in the mandatory 
minimum sentence based on a judge’s determination, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that Napolitan used a firearm 
to intimidate his victim, his state sentence violated Alleyne.4  
                                              
 3 To the extent Napolitan suggests that the District 
Court imposed the federal sentence consecutively in an effort 
to “fully punish[]” Napolitan for the state and federal 
convictions, Appellant’s Br. 24, he mischaracterizes the 
record.  The District Court simply applied U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 
in making its determination that the sentences for the two 
temporally proximate but distinct offenses should run 
consecutively; it did not state or imply that it was seeking to 
“fully punish” Napolitan for both offenses in some general 
sense outside of the discretion afforded to it by the 
Guidelines.  Indeed, the District Court explicitly rejected 
Napolitan’s argument that, because both the state and federal 
crimes arose in a similar time period, they were related and 
thus more likely to warrant concurrent sentences under 
§ 5G1.3, and Napolitan does not appear to challenge that 
conclusion on appeal. 
 
4 Napolitan’s argument rests on an assumption that, in 
the context of a challenge to his federal sentence on direct 
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According to Napolitan, under a constitutional state 
sentencing regime, his state sentence would have elapsed by 
the time the federal sentence was handed down; thus, 
Napolitan argues, he had been fully punished for his state 
conviction at the time of his federal sentencing and a 
concurrent federal sentence was therefore warranted.  For the 
reasons set forth below, we conclude the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in ordering Napolitan’s federal 
sentence to be served consecutively to his state sentence. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 We have jurisdiction to review the propriety of a 
federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(a).  We review the substantive reasonableness of a 
District Court’s sentence—including its choice to run the 
sentence consecutively to a state court sentence—for abuse of 
discretion, overturning such a sentence “only where ‘no 
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same 
sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the 
district court provided.’”  United States v. Freeman, 763 F.3d 
322, 335 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Mark v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 1189 (2015) and cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
1467 (2015) (quoting United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 
568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc)); United States v. Gillette, 738 
F.3d 63, 79 (3d Cir. 2013) (considering a challenge to the 
                                                                                                     
appeal, Alleyne would apply retroactively to his state 
sentence.  But see United States v. Reyes, 755 F.3d 210, 212-
13 (3d Cir. 2014) (concluding Alleyne does not apply 
retroactively to cases on collateral review); United States v. 
Winkelman, 746 F.3d 134, 136 (3d Cir. 2014) (same).  
Because we resolve this case on other grounds, we need not 
address this issue. 
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substantive reasonableness of the consecutive nature of two 
sentences). 
III. Discussion 
Napolitan acknowledges that the District Court “ha[s] 
no authority to cure his illegal state sentence,” Appellant’s Br. 
31, and thus that he may not on direct appeal contest the 
validity of his state sentence.  What he is arguing on appeal, 
he contends, is something entirely different: that a federal 
sentencing court necessarily abuses its discretion and imposes 
a substantively unreasonable sentence if it runs a federal 
sentence consecutively to an invalid state sentence.  We find 
the distinction Napolitan draws to be one without a difference 
because his proposed rule is, in fact, premised on exactly the 
type of collateral attack on his state sentence he insists he 
does not seek—a claim properly raised in a habeas petition, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  
 In any event, the arguments for such a rule already 
have been rejected by the Supreme Court.  In Custis v. United 
States, the Supreme Court held that, with the exception of two 
circumstances, “a defendant in a federal sentencing 
proceeding may [not] collaterally attack the validity of 
previous state convictions that are used to enhance his 
sentence.”  511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994).  There, a defendant 
sought to challenge the validity of past convictions that 
played a role in his federal sentencing on the grounds that the 
past convictions were obtained with unconstitutionally 
ineffective assistance of counsel and in violation of his right 
under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), to knowingly 
and voluntarily enter a guilty plea.  Custis, 511 U.S. at 488.  
The Supreme Court disagreed and held that a defendant may 
challenge the propriety of a previous state conviction that 
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affects his current federal sentencing only where (1) he 
alleges the “unique constitutional defect” that he was denied 
the right to counsel under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335 (1963), in the proceedings leading to such prior 
conviction, or (2) the statute under which he is currently 
being sentenced explicitly provides for the ability to 
collaterally attack “prior convictions used for sentence 
enhancement purposes.”  Custis, 511 U.S. at 490-97; accord 
United States v. Escobales, 218 F.3d 259, 261-263 (3d Cir. 
2000) (recognizing no Custis exception (1) for an alleged 
violation of a defendant’s right to a jury trial or (2) in the 
language of the criminal history provisions of the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines); United States v. Thomas, 42 F.3d 
823, 824-25 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying Custis to bar a 
defendant’s challenge to his federal sentence based on a 
constitutional defect in a prior state conviction because he 
alleged no Gideon violation and the applicable U.S. 
Sentencing Guideline lacked statutory authorization for such 
a challenge).   
 In reaching its conclusion in Custis, the Supreme Court 
sought to avoid condoning instances where, “[b]y challenging 
[a] previous conviction, the defendant [asks] a district 
court”—or here, an appellate court—“‘to deprive the state-
court judgment of its normal force and effect in a proceeding 
that has an independent purpose other than to overturn the 
prior judgment.’”  511 U.S. at 497 (quoting Parke v. Raley, 
506 U.S. 20, 30 (1992)).  Instead, the Court prescribed that 
where a defendant believes his prior state convictions were 
unlawful, the proper method of challenging such convictions 
is either through direct appeal in the state court or through 
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federal habeas review.5  Id.; Escobales, 218 F.3d at 261; see 
also Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 381 (2001) (“Our 
system affords a defendant convicted in state court numerous 
opportunities to challenge the constitutionality of his 
conviction.  He may raise constitutional claims on direct 
appeal, in postconviction proceedings available under state 
law, and in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . . . .”).6  Only if a defendant “is 
                                              
 5 In July 2015, almost five months after the District 
Court entered Napolitan’s federal sentence and nearly seven 
years after the state court sentenced Napolitan for his state 
conviction, Napolitan filed such a habeas petition alleging, 
among other things, ineffective assistance of counsel in his 
state proceedings and a due process violation for being 
sentenced under a state statute later deemed unconstitutional.  
Whatever the resolution of that petition, however, its 
pendency does not bear on the validity of Napolitan’s claim 
in this appeal that his federal sentence was substantively 
unreasonable at the time it was imposed. 
 
 6 A plurality of the Supreme Court has recognized that 
exceptions to the Custis rule may also exist in the 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254 or § 2255 context where “no channel of review was 
actually available to a defendant with respect to a prior 
conviction, due to no fault of his own,” Daniels, 532 U.S. at 
383-84 (plurality opinion), such as in the case of newly 
discovered evidence that comes to light after the “time for 
direct or collateral review has expired” or a state court’s 
refusal without justification “to rule on a constitutional claim 
that has been properly presented to it,” Lackawanna Cty. Dist. 
Att’y v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 405 (2001) (plurality opinion).  
Neither circumstance is presented here, as Napolitan contends 
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successful in attacking these state sentences” through one of 
the proper avenues, may he “then apply for reopening of any 
federal sentence enhanced by the state sentences.”  Custis, 
511 U.S. at 497.  The Court grounded its opinion in Custis in 
the goals of “promoting finality of judgments,” ensuring 
confidence in the integrity of the courts, advancing “the 
orderly administration of justice,” and avoiding asking 
sentencing courts “to rummage through frequently 
nonexistent or difficult to obtain state-court transcripts or 
records that may date from another era.”  Id. at 496-97. 
 Drawing on both the logic and language of Custis, we 
see no reason why state sentences should not be accorded the 
same respect and be subject to the same forms of substantive 
review afforded to state convictions.  To hold otherwise 
would be to contravene Custis by allowing a defendant “to 
deprive [a] state-court judgment of its normal force and 
effect” by way of a direct appeal of his federal sentence—“a 
proceeding that has an independent purpose other than to 
overturn the prior judgment.”  Id. at 497 (quoting Parke, 506 
U.S. at 30).  We therefore hold that an appellant may not 
collaterally attack a state court sentence as part of a federal 
                                                                                                     
that his state post-conviction collateral review counsel was 
ineffective for failing to raise his claim based on Alleyne, 
which was decided while his post-conviction collateral review 
petition was pending.  Thus, while Napolitan argues that “he 
has no remedy” to cure his allegedly unconstitutional state 
sentence, Appellant’s Br. 18, he does not now challenge his 
state sentence based on newly discovered evidence nor allege 
that the state courts have unjustifiably refused to rule on his 
Alleyne claim. 
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sentencing challenge unless (1) he claims a Gideon violation, 
or (2) the relevant federal statute or sentencing guideline 
expressly authorizes a collateral attack.7   
 Neither pertains here.  Napolitan’s reliance on Alleyne 
does not trigger the “unique constitutional defect” of a 
Gideon violation.  Id. at 496.  Nor does Napolitan identify 
any express authorization to support his collateral attack—
either in a statute or in the sentencing guidelines.  On the 
contrary, in ordering Napolitan’s federal sentence to run 
consecutively to his state sentence, the District Court relied 
upon U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, which confers on a defendant no 
express permission to challenge the legality of a prior 
sentence, and by its terms affords sentencing courts broad 
discretion to run multiple sentences for unrelated crimes 
consecutively, concurrently, or partially concurrently.  
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that, as a 
general matter, district courts may exercise their sound 
discretion in choosing whether to run a federal sentence 
consecutively to an existing state sentence.  See Setser v. 
United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1468 (2012) (citing Oregon v. 
                                              
 7 While Custis only referenced the federal statute 
under which a defendant is sentenced as a potential source of 
authorization to collaterally attack a past conviction, we have 
interpreted Custis to provide a route to launch such a 
collateral attack if the federal sentencing guideline pertinent 
to a defendant’s federal sentence confers such authorization, 
as well.  E.g., Escobales, 218 F.3d at 260; Thomas, 42 F.3d at 
824.  In extending Custis’s reach to prior state sentences, we 
adhere to our prior interpretation that sentencing guidelines 
could—in theory—offer an exception to the Custis rule. 
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Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 168-69 (2009)) (“Judges have long been 
understood to have discretion to select whether the sentences 
they impose will run concurrently or consecutively with 
respect to other sentences . . . that have been imposed in other 
proceedings, including state proceedings.”).  
 Our extension today of the Custis rule to state 
sentences leaves no room for Napolitan to appeal the 
consecutive running of his federal sentence.  For while 
couched as a challenge to the substantive reasonableness of 
his federal sentence, Napolitan’s claim boils down to the 
argument that a sentencing court abuses its considerable 
discretion to run sentences consecutively unless it 
independently confirms the validity of an existing state 
sentence—an approach that would require federal sentencing 
courts to undertake collateral review of any allegedly illegal 
state sentence and, upon a finding of constitutional defect, to 
determine the permissible length of the state sentence and to 
run a commensurate portion of the federal sentence 
concurrently to the unexpired state sentence to offset any 
unconstitutional time.  Such a rule would not only amount to 
a considerable constriction of district courts’ discretion as to 
whether to run sentences concurrently or consecutively, but 
also would be a cumbersome imposition on federal 
sentencing and a clear repudiation of the finality typically 
afforded to state court judgments—the very reasons the 
Supreme Court rejected such a rule as applied to state 
convictions in Custis, 511 U.S. at 496-97. 
 No doubt for these reasons, every Court of Appeals to 
have addressed the question has extended the precepts of 
Custis to bar collateral attacks in federal sentencing appeals 
against not only prior state convictions, but also prior state 
sentences.  In United States v. Saya, for example, the 
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defendant argued that he was improperly sentenced as a 
“career offender” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on two prior 
Hawaii state law convictions.  247 F.3d 929, 939-40 (9th Cir. 
2001).  Citing to Custis, the Ninth Circuit rejected the 
defendant’s attempt to “in effect . . . mount a collateral attack 
on his prior state sentence,” determining instead that there is 
“no reason why the Custis rule should not apply to collateral 
attacks on prior state sentences.”  Id. at 940 (emphasis in 
original); see also United States v. Galvan, 453 F.3d 738, 741 
(6th Cir. 2006) (concluding that “the district court at 
sentencing need not collaterally review [a defendant’s] prior 
sentences”);8 United States v. Warren, 335 F.3d 76, 77-79 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (holding a defendant may not collaterally attack 
the validity of a past federal “conviction or sentence” based 
on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 520 U.S. 466 (2000), in 
connection with a supervised release revocation proceeding).  
We join these Courts of Appeals today. 
IV. Conclusion 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the 
sentence imposed by the District Court. 
                                              
 8 While the Galvan court did not cite to Custis, it cited 
to the decision of another Court of Appeals that did and 
adopted the two exceptions to the Custis rule, thereby 
tracking Custis in substance.  Galvan, 453 F.3d at 741-42 
(citing United States v. Mateo, 271 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 
2001)).   
 
